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Introduction
Collective sensemaking is a form of socially-distributed cog-
nition (see Hutchins, 1995) in which multiple agents attempt
to interpret (make sense of) speciﬁc bodies of environmental
information. In order to optimize performance at the collec-
tive level, agents often need to share information about the
results of their own processing activity, and this raises ques-
tions about how the structure of communication networks af-
fects collective sensemaking abilities. In the current study,
we used a computational model of collective sensemaking in
which individual agents were implemented as constraint sat-
isfaction networks (CSNs) (see Smart & Shadbolt, 2012). We
then investigated how the cognitive responses of agents were
affected by different kinds of communication network struc-
ture.
Method
In order to explore the effect of communication network
structure on the dynamics of collective sensemaking, we
used a multi-agent computational model in which individual
agents were implemented as CSNs. The computational archi-
tecture of the CSNs is the same as that described in Smart and
Shadbolt (2012). Each agent consisted of 6 cognitive units,
which reﬂected the various kinds of beliefs that agents could
have about two types of object, namely cats and birds. The
net activation of each cognitive unit represented the extent to
which an agent held a speciﬁc belief about an object. Thus,
if the net activation of the ‘Cat’ unit was high then the agent
could be said to hold the belief represented by the ‘Cat’ cog-
nitive unit. The cognitive units were connected together in
such a way as to yield two kinds of interpretive response to
environmental information. On the one hand, agents could in-
terpret environmental information as indicating the presence
of a cat, and, on the other hand, they could interpret envi-
ronmental information as indicating the presence of a bird.
Across the course of each simulation, one of these cognitive
responses tended to predominate due to the pattern of exci-
tatory and inhibitory links between cognitive units. The way
in which the activation of each cognitive unit was updated
at each processing cycle is described in Smart and Shadbolt
(2012).
Each of the agents within the computational model can be
connected to other agents in order to create a communication
network. Agents can share information about their beliefs
at each cycle of a simulation in order to inﬂuence the kinds
of beliefs that their network neighbors have at the next pro-
cessing cycle. The way in which the information is shared
and processed by agents is described in Smart and Shadbolt
(2012).
Thecurrent studyexaminedthe effectoffour typesofcom-
munication network structure on collective sensemaking. In
the ‘Disconnected Network’ condition, all agents operated
autonomously and no communication was allowed between
the agents at any stage of the simulation. In the ‘Random
Network’ condition, agents were connected together using
a random network topology. The random networks, in this
case, were generated following the procedure described in
Mason, Jones, and Goldstone (2005). Bidirectional links be-
tween agents were added at random until a speciﬁc number of
links (i.e. 1.3 times the number of agents) had been created
(given that all our simulations involved 10 agents, the num-
ber of links added to random network conﬁgurations was (1.3
* 10 =) 13 links). In the ‘Small-World Network’ condition,
agents were connected together using a small-world network
topology. As with random networks, small-world networks
were generated using the procedure described in Mason et al.
(2005). Agents were initially connected into a ring structure.
Three agents were then selected at random and each of these
randomly selected agents was connected to another randomly
selected agent subject to the constraint that connected agents
wereatleast3agentsapartintheringtopology. Finally, inthe
case of the ‘Fully-Connected Network’ condition, all agents
were connected to all other agents using a fully-connected
network topology.
Each simulation started with the creation and conﬁguration
of CSNs corresponding to individual agents. Ten agents were
created for every simulation, and all agents were identical to
one another in terms of their constituent architecture. Agents
were then organized into one of four types of network struc-
tureasdescribedabove. Itshouldbenotedthatanewnetwork
structure was created for each simulation, thus the structure
of some networks (namely, the random and small-world net-
works) was not invariant across the experimental conditions.
Table 1: Activation vectors used in the experiment.
Fur Meows Cat Feathers Tweets Bird
Ambiguous 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
Unambiguous 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Once the network structure had been created, the activa-
tion levels of cognitive units within each agent were initial-
ized using one of two types of activation vector (see Table 1).-0.3
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Figure 1: Mean responses of ‘Cat’ and ‘Bird’ cognitive units in each of the four network structure conditions.
At the start of each simulation, 4 agents were selected at ran-
dom and were initialized with the ‘Unambiguous’ activation
vector; the remainder of the agents were initialized with the
‘Ambiguous’ activation vector.
After the initial activation levels had been established, the
simulation commenced and processing occurred in a series
of processing cycles. Within each cycle, the activation of all
cognitive units was updated as per the procedure described
in Smart and Shadbolt (2012). The simulation continued for
20 processing cycles, and, at the end of each simulation (i.e.
at the 20th processing cycle), the activation level of the ‘Cat’
and ‘Bird’ cognitive units was recorded for subsequent anal-
ysis. A total of 50 simulations were run in each of the four
network structure conditions.
Results
The results are shown in Figure 1. ANOVA revealed a sig-
niﬁcant main effect of Cognitive Unit (i.e. activation of
the ‘Cat’ and ‘Bird’ cognitive units) (F(1;1996) = 60.723, P
< 0.001) and a signiﬁcant two-way interaction between the
Network Structure and Cognitive Unit factors (F(3;1996) =
57.780, P < 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant main effect
of Network Structure (using a conservative alpha criterion of
0.01). Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test were
performed at each level of the Cognitive Unit factor. These
analyses revealed that cognitive responses in the random and
small-world network conditions were not signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from each other for either of the ‘Bird’ or ‘Cat’ cognitive
units. The activation level of the ‘Cat’ cognitive unit was
higher in both the random and small-world network condi-
tions as compared to the disconnected network condition, and
the activation of the ‘Bird’ cognitive unit was lower in the
random and small-world network conditions as compared to
the disconnected network condition. Activation of the ‘Cat’
cognitive unit was higher in the fully-connected network as
compared to all other networks, and activation of the ‘Bird’
unit was lower in the fully-connected network as compared to
all other networks. Post hoc comparisons of the cognitive re-
sponsesforeachofthenetworkstructuresrevealedsigniﬁcant
differences between the activation of ‘Cat’ and ‘Bird’ cogni-
tive units for all network conditions. Activation of the ‘Cat’
cognitive unit was higher than ‘Bird’ cognitive units for all
networks, with the exception of disconnected networks (see
Figure 1).
Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that collective sensemaking
isinﬂuencedbynetworkstructureundercertaininformational
conditions. In all of the conditions in which agents were al-
lowed to communicate information, a particular kind of cog-
nitive response emerged in which cat-related beliefs predom-
inated. This differed from the situation in which agents were
not allowed to communicate (i.e. the disconnected network
condition). The cognitive responses of agents that were orga-
nized into random and small-world network topologies were
very similar; however, they were less extreme than those of
agents organized into fully-connected network topologies.
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